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ABSTRACT
In this brief note, we prove that the existence of Nash equilibria on integer programming games is
Σp
2
-complete.
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1 Introduction
Integer programming games (IPGs) model games in which there is a finite set of playersM = {1, 2 . . . ,m} and each
player p ∈M has a set of feasible strategies Xp given by lattice points inside a polytopes described by finite systems
of linear inequalities. Therefore, each players aims to solve
max
xp∈XP
Πp(xp, x−p), (1)
where xp is player p’s strategy and x−p is the vector of strategies of all players, except player p.
A vector x ∈
∏
p∈M X
p is called a pure profile of strategies. If a pure profile of strategies x solves the optimization
problem (1) for all players, it is called pure Nash equilibrium. A game may fail to have pure equilibria and, therefore,
a broader solution concept for a game must be introduced, the Nash equilibria. Under this concept, each player
can assign probabilities to her pure strategies. Let ∆p denote the space of Borel probability measures over Xp and
∆ =
∏
p∈M ∆
p. Each player p’s expected payoff for a profile of strategies σ ∈ ∆ is
Πp(σ) =
∫
Xp
Πp(xp, x−p)dσ. (2)
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a profile of strategies σ ∈ ∆ such that
Πp(σ) ≥ Πp(xp, σ−p), ∀p ∈M ∀xp ∈ Xp. (3)
In [1], the authors discuss the existence of Nash equilibria for integer programming games. It is proven that the exis-
tence of pure Nash equilibria for IPGs is Σp
2
-complete and that even the existence of Nash equilibria is Σp
2
-complete.
However, the later proof seems incomplete in the “proof of only if”, since it does not support why we can conclude
that the leader cannot guarantee a payoff of 1. In the following section, we provide a correct proof using a completely
new reduction.
2 Computational Complexity
In what follows, we show that even in the simplest case, linear integer programming games with two players, the
existence of Nash equilibria is a Σp
2
-complete problem.
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Theorem 2.1 The problem of deciding if an IPG has a Nash equilibrium is Σp
2
-complete problem.
Proof. The proof that this decision problem belongs to Σp
2
can be found in [1].
It remains to show that it is Σp
2
-hard. We will reduce the following to Σp
2
-complete problem to it (see[2]):
Problem: SUBSET-SUM-INTERVAL
INSTANCE A sequence q1, q2, . . . , qk of positive integers; two positive integers R
and r with r ≤ k.
QUESTION Does there exist an integer S with R ≤ S < R + 2r such that none of
the subsets I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} satisfies
∑
i∈I qi = S?
Our reduction starts from an instance of SUBSET-SUM-INTERVAL. We construct the following instance of IPG
• The game has two players,M = {Z,W}.
• Player Z solves
max
z
1
2
z0 +
k∑
i=1
qizi +Qz(2w − z) (4a)
s.t.
1
2
z0 +
k∑
i=1
qizi ≤ z (4b)
z0, z1, . . . , zk ∈ {0, 1} (4c)
R ≤ z ≤ R + 2r − 1, z ∈ N (4d)
Add binary variables y ∈ {0, 1}r and make z = R +
∑r−1
i=0 2
iyi. Note that z
2 = Rz +
∑r−1
i=0 2
iyiz. Thus,
replace yiz by hi and add the respectiveMcCormick constraints [3]. In this way, we can equivalently linearize
the previous problem:
max
z,y,h
1
2
z0 +
k∑
i=1
qizi + 2Qzw−QRz −
r−1∑
i=0
2ihi (5a)
s.t.
1
2
z0 +
k∑
i=1
qizi ≤ z (5b)
z0, z1, . . . , zk ∈ {0, 1} (5c)
R ≤ z ≤ R+ 2r − 1, z ∈ N (5d)
z = R+
r−1∑
i=0
2iyi (5e)
y0, y1, . . . , yr−1 ∈ {0, 1} (5f)
hi ≥ 0 i = 0, . . . , r − 1 (5g)
hi ≥ z + (R+ 2
r − 1)(yi − 1) i = 0, . . . , r − 1 (5h)
hi ≤ z +R(yi − 1) i = 0, . . . , r − 1 (5i)
hi ≤ (R+ 2
r − 1)yi i = 0, . . . , r − 1 (5j)
For sake of simplicity, we consider the quadratic formulation (4). The linearization above serves the purpose
of showing that the proof is valid even under linear utility functions for the players.
• Player W solves
max
w
(1− z0)w0 (6a)
s.t. R ≤ w ≤ R+ 2r − 1, z ∈ N (6b)
w0 ∈ R (6c)
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(Proof of if). Assume that the SUBSET-SUM-INTERVAL instance has answer YES. Then, there is R ≤ S < R + 2r
such that for all subsets I ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, we have
∑
i∈I qi 6= S. Let playerW strategy be w
∗ = S and w∗
0
= 0. Note
that the term Qz(2w − z) in player Z’s utility is dominant and attains a maximum when z is equal to w. Thus, make
z∗ = w∗ = S and since
∑k
i=1 qizi is at most S − 1, make z
∗
0
= 1. Choose z∗i such that the remaining utility of player
Z is maximized. By construction, player Z is selecting her best response to (w∗, w∗
0
). Sinze z∗
0
= 1, then playerW is
also selecting an optimal strategy. Therefore, we can conclude that there is an equilibrium.
(Proof of only if). Assume that the SUBSET-SUM-INTERVAL instances has answer NO. Then, for allR ≤ S < R+2r,
there is a subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} such that
∑
i∈I qi = S. In this case, player Z will always make z0 = 0 which gives
incentive for playerW to choose w0 as large as possible. Since w0 has no upper bound, there is no equilibrium for the
game. 
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